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Abstract. We develop an instrumental variable approach for identification of dynamic
treatment effects on survival outcomes in the presence of dynamic selection, noncompli-
ance and right-censoring. The approach is nonparametric and does not require indepen-
dence of observed and unobserved characteristics or separability assumptions. We propose
estimation procedures and derive asymptotic properties. We apply our approach to eval-
uate a policy reform in which the pathway of unemployment benefits as a function of
the unemployment duration is modified. Those who were unemployed at the reform date
could choose between the old and the new regime. We find that the new regime has a
positive average causal effect on the job finding rate.
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1. Introduction
In the evaluation of labor market policies, such as job search assistance and classroom
training, it is usually interesting to compare the impact of the policy on the long-term
unemployed to the impact on those who only lost their jobs very recently. Differences
between effects at low durations and high durations may shed light on the extent to
which individual behavior changes over time and this may be relevant for policy design
(see e.g. Van den Berg (2001)). Empirical and theoretical studies therefore tend to focus on
the evaluation of dynamic treatment effects conditional on survival at a range of elapsed
durations.
However, the identification of such dynamic treatment effects is typically hampered by
several hurdles. First, if individuals can choose a treatment arm different from the one
assigned to them (noncompliance), then standard conditional independence assumptions
will be violated. Second, suppose the treatment is randomized at the inflow into unem-
ployment. In the presence of unobserved determinants of the outcome, their distributions
among survivors at some later point in time may differ across different treatment arms
(dynamic selection), see Meyer (1996), Ham and LaLonde (1996), Eberwein et al. (1997)
and Abbring and van den Berg (2005). This raises the question of how to choose the
treatment and control groups in a dynamic setup. Finally, when the outcome of interest
is a duration variable, identification might be hampered by right-censoring.
In this paper, we develop an instrumental variable (IV) approach for identification of
dynamic treatment effects in the presence of dynamic selection, noncompliance and right-
censoring. Our method is fully nonparametric and we do not impose independence of
observed and unobserved characteristics or separability in their effects on the outcome.
We propose estimation procedures and derive their asymptotic properties.
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At the core of our method is a dynamic potential outcomes framework. A treatment is
assigned at some random elapsed duration of unemployment. The interest is in the effect
of this treatment on post-treatment outcomes such as post-treatment unemployment
duration. A major question in this setup is how to define a meaningful treatment effect.
While the standard static literature defines those who are not observed to enroll into
the treatment as nontreated, in a dynamic setting this approach leads to conditioning on
future successful outcomes, Sianesi (2004).1 To avoid this problem, we follow much of the
literature on dynamic treatment effects and focus on treatment effects on the subgroup
of those individuals who remain unemployed at least until the treatment, see e.g. Sianesi
(2004), Vikstro¨m (2014) and Van den Berg et al. (2014).
Our main contribution is to extend the dynamic treatment evaluation framework to
allow for endogenous noncompliance. Noncompliance has been largely ignored by the
literature on dynamic treatment effects, despite the attention it has received in the static
literature. We develop a dynamic concept of noncompliance which allows the individual
to change preferences in an arbitrary way over time. The intuition behind is that whether
an unemployed accepts to participate or not in a labor market program depends on her
subjective probability to find a job and this probability might change with the elapsed
duration of unemployment.
Our method relies on two major assumptions. The first one is exogenous variation
in the timing of treatment assignment. As a motivation, consider a case worker who
is responsible for a large pool of unemployed. Then, conditional on characteristics of
the unemployed, the case worker might assign the order in which the unemployed are
advised idiosyncratically, see e.g. Sianesi (2004). Our strategy is also motivated by the
so-called phased-in experiments, in which randomly selected late recipients provide a
1 In particular, individuals who find a job before the treatment is assigned to them are considered as
nontreated.
4 GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG∗, PETYO BONEV†, ENNO MAMMEN‡
control group for randomly selected early recipients, see Duflo et al. (2007). Finally, when
a policy is administered at a single point in time, then the presence of cohorts who enter
unemployment at different points in time might also give rise to quasi-experimental
variation in the time to treatment.
The second one is a dynamic consistency assumption commonly referred to as ”no
anticipation” in the literature, see Abbring and van den Berg (2003). This assumption
requires that if two labor market treatments coincide up to a duration t, then the hazards
of unemployment duration under the two treatments should be the same for each pre-
treatment duration. With forward-looking individuals, this may require that individuals
do not anticipate the (time of) treatment or do not act upon their knowledge. The no
anticipation assumption has been used throughout the literature on dynamic treatment
effects, Cre´pon et al. (2009), Crepon et al. (2010), Vikstro¨m (2014). Moreover, it is an implicit
assumption in some standard static approaches, such as the Difference-in-Difference (DiD)
and the Synthetic Control approaches. It is also an implicit assumption in the phased-in
experiments, where ignoring the time dimension effectively subsumes the no anticipation
assumption into the randomization assumption. Our paper puts phased-in experiments
into a dynamic framework and makes the link to no anticipation explicit.
Our identification strategy consists of two steps: a dynamic and a static one. In the
dynamic step, initial randomization of the assignment and no anticipation ensure that
dynamic selection follows the same pattern for early and late treatment recipients at each
pre-treatment duration.2 This allows for a comparison of treated and not-yet-treated indi-
viduals at the same elapsed duration of unemployment. In a second step, the assignment
2 Van den Berg et al. (2014) derive this result in a context with full compliance. We generalize their result
to a setup with endogenous noncompliance.
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to treatment is used as an instrument for the endogenous enrollment into treatment. Infor-
mation on observed compliance from the early recipients is used to identify the outcome
distribution of late, not-yet-treated, recipients.
With these two steps, our paper provides a link between the dynamic treatment evalu-
ation literature, Vikstro¨m (2014), Sianesi (2004), Michael et al. (2011), Van den Berg et al.
(2014) and the standard static LATE literature, Imbens and Angrist (1994), Imbens and
Rubin (1997). Identification is local in the sense that at each point in time the effect is
identified only for those who would comply at this particular point in time. The static
notion of location is thus extended with a time component. The corresponding estimators
can be viewed as dynamic Wald estimators. Moreover, in a setup where time to treatment
in the control group approaches the time to treatment in the treatment, our method can
be extended to a dynamic fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) approach.
Our paper contributes to the literature on IV in survival analysis, see e.g. Eberwein
et al. (1997), Robins and Tsiatis (1991), Chesher (2002), Bijwaard and Ridder (2005), Bi-
jwaard (2008) and Tchetgen et al. (2014). Much of this literature is surveyed by Abbring
and van den Berg (2005). Typically, these studies adopt a semiparametric or a parametric
model structure. Our model, on the contrary, is fully nonparametric. Dynamic discrete
choice models also deal with identification of dynamic treatment effects, see e.g. Heck-
man and Navarro (2007). Contrary to our approach, those papers rely on period-specific
exclusion restrictions as well as on restrictive separability and identification-at-infinity
assumptions. Our approach is also related to the literature on duration models with a
Mixed Proportionate Hazard (MPH) structure and time-varying covariates, in particular
to the important paper of Hausman and Woutersen (2014). A thorough overview of this
literature is provided in Hausman and Woutersen (2008). Similar to our approach, identi-
fication in Hausman and Woutersen (2014) relies on variation in the time to treatment. The
major difference is how dynamic selection is handled. While we handle dynamic selection
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by assuming no anticipation of the treatment, dynamic selection is modeled explicitly in
Hausman and Woutersen (2014) through the semi-parametric assumption on the hazard,
and in particular through a separability assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition, their rank estimator utilizes the monotonicity of the hazard function in the
observed covariates X implied by a parametric assumption. Another paper that utilizes
variation in the time to treatment as a source of identification is Abbring and van den
Berg (2003). Contrary to our nonparametric model, both the treatment process and the
effect of the treatment on the outcome duration are modeled within the semiparametric
MPH framework. Finally, our dynamic RD extension is related to the static RD approach
in Hahn et al. (2001).
An additional contribution of our paper is to develop a theoretical framework for the
analysis of noncompliance in a dynamic setting. Specifically, we propose how to test for
endogenous noncompliance and how to measure the bias that would arise if endogeneity
is ignored. Measuring selection bias can provide valuable insights on the reasons for the
non-take up of a policy reform and thus help improve policy design.
We use our approach to evaluate the French 2001 labor market policy reform PARE. This
reform introduced a more generous unemployment benefits system together with more
stringent monitoring and training measures. Individuals who were unemployed at the
moment of the reform could choose whether to stay in the old regime for the remaining
duration of their spell or to enter the new regime immediately. Our results suggest that
this policy increased the exit rate out of unemployment. Our findings are supported by
an extensive empirical examination of the plausibility of the assumptions.
2. Econometric framework
2.1. Treatment effects. For illustrative purposes, we build our exposition on a labor
market example. Suppose we observe a sample of n individuals who are searching for
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a job. As part of Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs), the unemployed are offered
a job search training. The elapsed duration at which the individuals are offered the
training might vary across individuals and is denoted by Zi for individual i = 1 . . .n. The
unemployed may accept or refuse to participate and the training is offered only once.
Allowing for noncompliance mimics unemployment insurance (UI) systems in which
ALMPs are not enforced or sanctions for violations are either very mild or come with
a low probability. Examples for such UI systems are the Swedish, the French and the
Australian ones.3 This setup also applies to experimental studies, in which the subjects
are invited to participate (encouragement design, see e.g. Duflo et al. (2007)) or can simply
refuse to participate.
Denote by Si the actual pre-treatment duration, that is, the time individual i spends
in unemployment until she receives the training. We focus on the case in which if the
individual complies, the treatment must be taken immediately, and thus Si coincides with
Zi, Si = Zi. If the individual refuses the treatment, she is never treated, which we normalize
to Si =∞.
We are interested in the effect of the job search training on the unemployment duration.
When defining a treatment effect of interest, there are two important aspects endemic to
the dynamic setting. First, the timing of the treatment Si might matter: job search training
might have different effects on the (total or post-treatment) unemployment duration
at different elapsed unemployment durations, see Abbring and van den Berg (2003). We
therefore allow the counterfactual outcome to depend on the pre-treatment duration Si. In
particular, for each s ∈ R+ ∪{∞}, denote by Ti(s) the potential duration of unemployment
if the treatment was received at an elapsed duration s. With this notation we implicitly
3 See Sianesi (2004), Crepon et al. (2010) and Carney and Ramia (2011).
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impose an exclusion restriction on Zi,
(2.1) Ti(s, z) = Ti(s) for each s, z ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}.
(2.1) prevents the assignment to treatment from directly impacting the outcome: Zi can
influence the duration only through the actual pre-treatment duration Si. This assumption
is plausible in our setting since we restrict Zi and Si to realize simultaneously from
viewpoint of the unemployed. This is in contrast to the case in which the assignment to
treatment realizes prior to the treatment.4
The second aspect that differs from the static framework is that a simple comparison
of treated and nontreated within the treatment definition window possibly leads to a
bias.5 In particular, if an individual finds a job prior to the treatment, Si will be censored
by Ti and therefore unobserved. Considering these individuals as nontreated effectively
conditions on their future successful outcomes, Sianesi (2004). We therefore follow the
approach chosen by much of the literature on dynamic treatment effects and condition
on survival in unemployment up to treatment, e.g. Vikstro¨m (2014) and Sianesi (2004).6
The main object of interest is the post-treatment duration of a particular group of
compliers. We model compliance in this dynamic framework in the following way. For
each z ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, denote by Si(z) the potential pre-treatment duration of individual i if
she was assigned to receive the treatment at z. Following the exposition above, Si(z) can
be either equal to z or to ∞.
4 The standard example of non-simultaneous realizations is when the individual is warned about a future
sanction due to noncompliance with UI rules, see Crepon et al. (2010). In this case, Zi might have a direct
effect on the outcome, which is often referred to as a threat effect.
5 Treatment definition window is the period of time used in a static setup to define the treatment status.
6 Following the standard terminology in survival analysis, we refer to the remaining in the state of
interest (e.g. unemployment) to as survival, and to the corresponding individuals as survivors.
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With these preliminaries, we define the treatment effect of interest as
TE(t, t′, a) = E[P{T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t}(2.2)
− P{T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t} ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t],
where t and t′ be two fixed elapsed durations with t < t′, a is a positive number in (0, t′− t],
X is an observed random vector of individual characteristics such as age, qualification and
experience, and V is an unobserved random variable that captures ex ante heterogeneity
in terms of unobserved characteristics. We may refer to V as unobserved confounders. In
labor market register data, such as our data, these may be non-cognitive abilities such as
the degree of intrinsic motivation. Both X and V are time-constant and realized prior the
spell of unemployment.7
The interpretation of (2.2) is as follows. Since t + a < t′, all individuals assigned to be
treated at t′ are not yet treated in [t, t + a). Thus, P{T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t}
can be interpreted as the individual potential outcome of a nontreated individual who
would remain unemployed under the treatment t′ at least until t. P{T(t) ∈ [t, t+ a) ∣ T(t) ≥
t,X,V,S(t) = t} is the corresponding outcome of a treated at t individual. Thus,
(2.3) P{T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t} − P{T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t}
is the additive individual treatment effect on the probability to leave unemployment in
[t, t + a) for an individual who is still unemployed at t. Expression (2.2) is an average of
(2.3). The average is built with respect to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
7 We surpress the index i for notational simplicity.
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V among the treated survivors, FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t.8 Proposition 3.1 shows, that under certain
assumption this is also the distribution of V among all survivors at t.
Conditioning on S(t) = t restricts the evaluation of the effect on the t-compliers, i.e. the
individuals who would take the treatment at an elapsed duration t if it was assigned to
them. Offering the treatment only once means that we only allow for one-sided noncom-
pliance. With one-sided noncompliance, the set of treated compliers coincides with the
full set of treated (at elapsed duration t). Therefore, (2.2) can be interpreted as a treatment
effect on the treated.
By conditioning on survival up to treatment and focusing on the post-treatment out-
come, (2.2) closely resembles the definition of a treatment effect in the dynamic impact
evaluation literature. The novel aspect which our paper introduces is to explicitly allow
for noncompliance. The stochastic process {S(t)}t≥0 is a generalization of the static com-
pliance model in the LATE literature, Imbens and Angrist (1994). (2.2) thus provides a
natural link between the dynamic treatment evaluation literature and the static LATE.
Remarks. 1. It is clear from definition (2.2) that the duration outcome T(s) can be
replaced by an arbitrary post-treatment outcome Y(s). In fact, our identification strategy
presented in the next section does not rely on the outcome being a duration variable.9 2.
For any two t, t′, there is a variety of possible treatment effects, one for each a ∈ (0, t′− t). In
addition, an evaluation of the total effect of a policy might involve averages over all t and
t′. 3. An important special case of (2.2) is the limit case a → 0. It amounts to a treatment
effect on the hazard function. We devote special attention to this case in the next section
and in the appendix. 4. The precise interpretation of (2.2) is less straightforward when
8 Note that (2.2) can be also written as
EV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t[P{T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t} − P{T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t}]
9 Our estimator, however, utilizes the relation between the outcome and the conditioning set.
NONPARAMETRIC IV METHODS FOR DYNAMIC TREATMENT EVALUATION 11
the treatment is not instantaneous. As an example, long term training measures induce
a lock-in effect. One approach followed in the literature is to treat the lock-in effect as
constituent of the total treatment effect, see Sianesi (2004). A second problem, however,
is that the length of an non-instantaneous treatment might also matter. We therefore
concentrate on instantaneous treatments, such as short-term training, counseling and
other activating measures. In the context of the labor market example, such focus is not
an important restriction, as there is a general trend in labor market policies towards short-
term activation and reemployment ALMPs, see e.g. Biewen et al. (2014). 5. Expression (2.2)
implies that we treat T(s) as a random variable even when we condition on all observed
and unobserved characteristics X,V. By doing that, we follow the general approach in
mixture duration models pioneered by Lancaster (1979). The underlying assumption is
that the randomness in T(s) comes from some intrinsic uncertainty in the transition, not
observed and controlled by the individual.10
2.2. Two empirical setups. We focus on two particular empirical setups.
Setup I: comprehensive treatment. Consider a treatment that is comprehensive in
the sense, that it is assigned and potentially administered to all eligible individuals at a
common point in calendar time (”treatment day”), see figure 1a. The standard example
here is a policy reform introduced via a change in legislation. A group of individuals who
become unemployed at a common date is referred to as a cohort. In this setup, Zi is the
length of the time spell between the date of inflow into unemployment of individual i
and the treatment day. When t < t′, we refer to the cohort {Z = t} (in short, the t−cohort)
as the younger cohort and to the {Z = t′} cohort as the older one. If an individual i from
the t−cohort remains unemployed until the treatment day, then Si = t (enrollment into
treatment) or Si = ∞. If the individual finds a job (or, in general, exits the labor market)
10 This distinction, however, is arbitrary and is mainly made for technical reasons, Lancaster (1990).
12 GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG∗, PETYO BONEV†, ENNO MAMMEN‡
prior to the treatment day, then Si is not observed. Empirical example I. In section 6, we
(a) Setup I (b) Setup II
Figure 1. Two empirical setups
evaluate the French unemployment policy reform PARE which changed the payments
structure of unemployment benefits and introduced ALMPs such as training. The new
regime was effective from the 1st of July 2001 (comprehensive treatment assignment).
Noncompliance was possible.
Setup II: phased-in treatment. Consider a group of individuals who enter the state of
interest simultaneously (a single cohort). Treatment is assigned at different elapsed dura-
tions for different individuals, see figure 1b. Empirical example II (a): time variation in
ALMPs. Often there is time variation in the administering of ALMPs accross individuals,
see e.g. Lalive et al. (2005), Sianesi (2004), Crepon et al. (2010) and Abbring and van den
Berg (2003). Time variation might be necessary due to budgetary or other administrative
reasons. If a case worker is responsible for a large group of unemployed, then meetings
and coaching sessions must be assigned at different dates and hence at different elapsed
durations of unemployment Zi. Empirical example II (b): phased-in implementation
of social programs and field experiments. Consider a social program that is character-
ized by a phased-in implementation: some units (regions or individuals) are assigned to
be treated earlier, while others later. Phased-in implementation might be necessary for
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similar reasons as in example II (a). Alternatively, a comprehensive program might be
preceded by pilot studies introduced at varying times, which also gives rise to the setup
described above. As an example, Blundell et al. (2004) utilize the presence of area-based
pilot studies of the UK policy reform ”New Deal for Young People” (NDYP) to identify
its impact on unemployment.11 An important subcategory is the phased-in (or pipeline,
or rolled out) experimental design, in which the treatment is assigned at different times
and the order is randomized. The seminal deworming study of Miguel and Kremer (2004)
is the standard example here. Not-yet-treated individuals are taken as a control group
for already treated individuals. Below, we explicitly formalize the assumptions that are
typically made in this literature.
3. Identification of dynamic treatment effects
3.1. Assumptions. Consider the following assumptions.
Assumption A1 (Dynamic noncompliance). For any t, it holds either S(t) = t or S(t) = +∞.
Assumption A1 defines the possible type of noncompliance. Agents are only allowed
to choose between being treated at the assigned point in time and being never treated.
A1 precludes the type of choices S(t) = t′ for some t′ ≠ t with t′ <∞. One the other hand,
A1 allows individuals to change their preferences over time in an arbitrary way. As an
example, for t < t′, individual i is allowed to choose Si(t) =∞ and Si(t′) = t′. A noncomplier
at t might be a complier at t′. In the context of an ALMP, an unemployed worker’s decision
whether to participate or not in an offered training at a given point in time will depend
on the worker’s subjective probability of the prospects to get a job without the training.
Unsuccessful period of search might increase the readiness to participate as the individual
gets more pessimistic.
11 A further example for pilot studies is the implementation of the Progresa welfare reform in Mexico,
see e.g. Todd (2007). Another example for phased-in social programs is the study of the effect of titling land
properties on the labor market participation, Field (2007).
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A1 mimics the standard static noncompliance model, in which the treatment is offered
only once, see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999). At the same time, the process {S(t)}t∈R+∪∞ extends
the static concept of noncompliance by adding time structure. For a given point in time t,
A1 corresponds to a one-sided noncompliance in the static treatment evaluation literature.
One-sided noncompliance precludes the existence of always-takers and defiers.12 As a
result, no monotonicity-type assumption (as the one invoked in static LATE model) is
needed for identification.
Examples I and II (a), continued. Assumption A1 is natural in the setup of the PARE
reform, in which the treatment is administered at one single point in calendar time. Ad-
ministrative and legislative rules prevent unemployed from enrolling into the treatment
at earlier or later dates. In the context of the Swedish ALMPs, however, an assignment to
treatment (Z) by a case worker serves only as a recommendation. An unemployed is free
to enroll into the treatment earlier or later, or never. Thus, S(t) = t′ is possible for t′ < t and
t′ > t, which violates A1.
Assumption A2 (No anticipation). Let ΘT(s) be the integrated hazard of T(s). Then, for each
real t′ ≥ t ≥ 0, it holds
(3.1) ΘT(t′)(t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)) = ΘT(∞)(t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)).
A2 states that present potential outcomes are not influenced by future events. This can
be more clearly the following relationship
(3.2) P(T(t′) > t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)) = P(T(∞) > t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)).
Equality (3.2) is equivalent to A2. It states that the individual survival probability up
to some earlier time t remains the same under any potential future treatment times
t′, t′′ (t ≤ t′, t′′). Conditioning on S(t),S(t′) implies that A2 is valid for the subgroups of
12 To see this, note that A1 precludes choices S(∞) = t for t < ∞. See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for the
definitions of always-takers and never-takers.
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compliers and noncompliers at t and t′. In a setting with forward-looking individuals,
A2 is satisfied when the information structure is invariant to the potential assignment
of the treatment. There are two major cases when A2 can be viewed as plausible. The
first case is when individuals have no knowledge on the point in time of treatment (i.e.
they do not anticipate it). As an example, the assignment to ALMPs may occur without a
preliminary notice so that the timing is unexpected to the unemployed. This is almost by
definition true for some punitive treatments such as sanctions. The second case is when
individuals do not act upon the knowledge of the time to treatment. As an example,
the treatment might be so complex or the consequences so ambiguous, that the resulting
uncertainty deters the unemployed from adapting their behavior. In the context of the
PARE reform (example I), the unemployed individuals were informed on a short notice
(2 weeks) about the upcoming reform. The exact content and the start of the reform were
subject to persistent political debate, so that its actual implementation came as a surprise.
No anticipation in Setup II. A2 is implicitly assumed in all experiments with a phased-
in design (example II (b)). A unit treated at t′ can be used at t, t < t′, as a control for
a unit treated at t only if the not-yet-treated unit does not anticipate the treatment at t′.
Violation of this assumption is considered to be one major potential flaw in the evaluation
of phased-in treatments, Duflo et al. (2007). Note that phased-in experiments are typically
evaluated in a static framework. The ”no anticipation” assumption is hidden in the
randomization assumption. In a dynamic framework, however, (initial) randomization
is not sufficient since evaluation typically conditions upon survival. Due to dynamic
selection, the composition in the different treatment arms might change differently. Here,
A2 is sufficient to complement a static randomization assumption. We establish the link
explicitly in the next section.
No anticipation in Setup I. A2 has a subtle additional implication in Setup I. Because
the spells of treatment and control cohorts begin at different calendar dates, an elapsed
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duration of t time units is also reached at different dates. Thus, expression (3.1) not only
requires that individuals do not anticipate the (date of the) treatment, but also that the
economic conditions of treatment and control cohorts are identical. This requirement can
be seen as a stationarity requirement on the data generation process (no cohort effects).
As an example, if the local labor market conditions change substantially between two
cohorts, then assumption A2 would be violated even if individuals do not anticipate the
treatment.
No anticipation in the dynamic literature. In the context of ALMPs, the ”no anticipation”
assumption has been adopted throughout the theoretical and empirical literature on
dynamic treatment effects, see e.g. Sianesi (2004), Vikstro¨m (2014), Abbring and van den
Berg (2003). Much of this literature is surveyed in Crepon et al. (2010).
No anticipation in the static evaluation literature. Assumption A2 is often implicitly as-
sumed in static evaluation approaches. One example is the phased-in experimental design
discussed above. Further example is the DiD approach. Anticipation effects potentially
undermine the parallel trends assumption, see e.g. Lalive (2008) for an application in a
labor market context. A third example is the Synthetic Control approach, where A2 is an
implicit component of the conditional independence assumption.
Assumption A3 (Randomization). It holds
(3.3) (i) Z ⊥ {T(s),S(t)}t,s∈R+⋃{+∞} ∣ X,V and (ii) Z ⊥ V ∣ X.
Assumption A3 is a randomization assumption. In the context of Setup II, assumption
A3 (i) postulates that assignment to treatment (Z) is independent of potential outcomes
conditional on observed and unobserved covariates. Since X and V are assumed to fully
describe an individual, this is an innocuous assumption. The major component of A3
is assumption A3 (ii). It states that the instrument Z is independent of unobservables
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conditionally on observables. It holds the following implication:
(3.4) A3(i),A3(ii)⇒ Z ⊥ {T(s),S(t)} ∣ X.
Thus, under A3, assignment of Z is driven by X. Example II (a), continued. Suppose
that a case worker is responsible for a large pool of unemployed individuals. Then it
can be argued that she acts idiosyncratically given (objective) characteristics of the un-
employed and her own assessment of the unemployed.13 In such cases, A3 is valid if
both the objective characteristics and the case worker’s assessment are also available to
the econometrician. As a further example consider randomized phased-in experiments.
A3 is valid per design construction. In the case of phased-in implementation of social
programs, A3 holds whenever the early/late recipients are randomly selected. In Setup I,
the plausibility of A3 hinges on the stability of the economic environment: A3 requires
identical economic environments at the dates of inflow of young and old cohorts. The
relation to A3 in Setup II is best explained with a thought experiment, which features
individuals randomly assigned to different cohorts. Differences in the structural economic
parameters of treated vs nontreated cohorts (cohort effects) violate A3. Such differences
can be caused e.g. by mass layoffs and macroeconomic trends.
Assumption A4 (Consistency). For all t, s ∈ R+⋃{+∞}
i) Z = t⇒ S(t) = S
ii) S = s⇒ T(s) = T.
The consistency assumption states that a potential outcome corresponding to a given
treatment is observed if the treatment is actually assigned. Another way to write it is
T = T(S),S = S(Z). This is a standard assumption in the treatment evaluation literature. It
13 As an example, in the paper of Sianesi (2004), such assessments relate to the job-seeker’s degree of
job readiness, as well as to the job-seeker’s inclinations and urgency to find a job. These assessments are
documented and part of the observed covariates used in Sianesi (2004).
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provides the link between potential outcomes and observables. Assumptions A1 and A4
imply together that the actual elapsed duration at which the treatment is received, S, can
be either equal to Z or to ∞.
In addition to assumptions A1-A4, we implicitly assume that all expressions below
exist. This amounts to common support assumptions such as 0 < P(S = t ∣ X,V,Z = t).
These assumptions are fulfilled for example when S and Z are discrete, but it is sufficient
that S and Z have a positive probability mass on t and t′. Whether discrete Z and S impose
a restriction on the distribution of T depends on the concrete application. In the medical
treatment example, a specific therapy might be assigned only at predetermined, common
for everybody, elapsed time intervals of the disease, whereas the life or disease duration
itself is a continuous variable. In the labor market example, the administrative duration of
unemployment is always discrete. Nevertheless, it is usually modeled in the literature as
a continuous variable, especially when it is measured on a daily basis. On the other hand,
labor market treatments such as training and counseling measures or financial penalties
might be designed to come into force only at coarser time intervals. Therefore, it might
be practical to model them as discrete variables.
Remark 6. (Potential biases in Setup I.)14 Denote the calendar date of treatment in Setup I
with day 0. Consider cohorts Z = t and Z = t′ which enter unemployment at dates −t and
−t′, respectively, with t < t′. From the discussion of A2 and A3, nonstationary economic
environment emerges as a possible source of bias in Setup I. We distinguish between
two cases. Case 1: the economic environment is stationary up to date 0, and there is a
structural change after 0. This can be the case, for example, when other economic policies
are implemented at 0 alongside with the ALMP of interest. One approach to isolate the
effect of the ALMP of interest would be to consider the limit case a→ 0. The validity of this
14 This remark and the resulting RD analysis in section 3.3 below result from a hint by an anonymous
referee, for which we are thankful.
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approach would hinge upon the assumption that the change in the economic environment
at/after 0 has no instantaneous effect on the unemployment duration. In this case, our main
identification strategy described in section 3.2 below would yield an unbiased estimator
of the treatment effect on the hazard. Case 2: in the general case of different economic
conditions, the hazard approach is not sufficient. In this case, one approach would be to
consider the limit case t′ → t+, where the + sign indicates convergence from the right. The
intuition of this approach is that individuals that enter unemployment at two points in
time that are very close are basically evaluated in the same economic environment. This
strategy will lead to RD-type estimator, see section 3.3. A drawback of both approaches
(Case 1 and Case 2) is the limitation of the set of treatment effects we can evaluate. In
both cases, namely, we restrict the window a to be very short.15 This drawback is closely
related to the critique of the phased-in design experiments, in which evaluation of long-
term effects is in general not possible, Duflo et al. (2007).
3.2. Identification results. Assume first that T is observable. Consider expression (2.2).
The main challenge is to find a control group for those who survived until t and were
treated at t. In particular, T(t′) and S(t) are never jointly observed. They correspond to
different treatments (t′ and t). Thus, one of the outcomes T(t′),S(t) is always counterfac-
tual. To motivate our identification strategy, consider the following naive candidates for
a treatment effect:
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t),(3.5)
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t′,Z = t′)(3.6)
15 In the second case, a→ 0 is implied by a ≤ t′ − t.
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for t′ > t. For simplicity, we set the discussion in the context of Setup I. Writing (3.5) in the
form
EV∣T≥t,X,S=t,Z=t[P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t,V)] −
EV∣T≥t,X,S=∞,Z=t[P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t,V)]
makes it clear that (3.5) compares averages over two different subgroups of the same
cohort: the t-compliers and the t-noncompliers. Since S is a choice variable, it holds in
general
(3.7) V /⊥ S ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t.
Thus, (3.5) captures not only the treatment effect but also the selection bias. The non-
surprising implication is that noncompliers are not suitable as a control group.
Expression (3.6) compares the average outcome at elapsed duration t of the t-compliers
from the younger cohort {Z = t} with the average outcome (at the same duration) of the
t’-compliers from the older cohort {Z = t′}. In general, however, FV∣T≥t,S=t,Z=t ≠ FV∣T≥t,S=t′,Z=t′
due to dynamic selection. This follows because some unemployed might find a job be-
tween elapsed durations t and t′, while others might change their preferences. As a result,
learning the compliance status at t′ is also not helpful for constructing a control group.
The above considerations apply equivalently for Setup II.
Instead, our strategy combines the approach of the dynamic treatment effects literature
with the static LATE approach. Thus, identification consists of two steps: a dynamic and
a static one. Our dynamic step, presented in the next proposition, extends the result of
Van den Berg et al. (2014) to a setting with endogenous noncompliance.16
16 All proofs are in the online appendix.
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Proposition 3.1. Let F be a cdf. Under assumptions A1 to A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0
FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T(t′)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T≥t,X,S=t,Z=t and(3.8)
FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=∞ = FV∣T(t′)≥t,X,S(t)=∞ = FV∣T≥t,X,S=∞,Z=t.(3.9)
To interpret proposition 3.1, consider example I. Assume that we observe two cohorts
(t and t′) of unemployed individuals with dates of inflow −t = −6 and −t′ = −9 (0 is set
to be equal to 01.07.2001, the day of the implementation of the reform). The first equality
in (3.8) states that under A1 - A4, individuals in cohort t who have been unemployed
for at least 6 months and are willing to take the treatment have the same distribution of
V as individuals in cohort t′ who also have been unemployed for at least 6 months and
are willing to take the treatment. The second equality of (3.8) links potential to observed
conditions. (3.9) provides an equivalent result for the group of t-noncompliers. Note, that
an implication of proposition 3.1 is that the treatment effects on the treated survivors,
{T(t) ≥ t}, and on the nontreated survivors, {T(t′) ≥ t}, and hence on all survivors,
coincide.
The intuition behind proposition 3.1 is the following. If the unobserved heterogeneity
V has the same distribution in the two cohorts at the point in time of inflow (conditional
on X), and if these distributions evolve over time in the same way, then V will have the
same distribution in the two cohorts at a later pre-treatment elapsed duration t > 0, see the
dotted lines in figures 2a and 2b. The equality of the distributions of V at t = 0 is ensured by
the randomization assumptions A3. The dynamics is controlled by the ”no anticipation”
assumption A2. The interpretation and intuition for Setup II are equivalent with cohorts
replaced by groups of individuals who are assigned to the treatment at different dates.
To motivate the second step of our approach (the static step), consider the following
corollary of proposition 3.1.
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Corollary 3.1. Let a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0
TE(t, t′, a) = P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)(3.10)
−P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).
The r.h.s. of (3.10) does not contain the unobserved V. Thus, if the compliance status
(S(t)) was observed, the treatment effect could be calculated by comparing the average
outcome of compliers from the treated group {Z = t}, denoted by F1,C, with the average
outcome of compliers from the not-yet-treated group, {Z = t′}, denoted by F0,C. For the
subgroup {Z = t}, S(t) is observed at elapsed duration t. Therefore, F1,C is identified. For
the not-yet-treated {Z = t′}, however, S(t) is unobserved.
Our static step is as follows. Consider the average potential outcome of all nontreated
survivors, F0 = P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t), where the dependency on X is suppressed.
The key to identification is the decomposition of F0
(3.11) F0 = F0,CP0,C + F0,NP0,N,
where F0,N is the average outcome for noncompliers in the nontreated group, and P0,C
and P0,N are the proportions of compliers and noncompliers in that group, respectively
(all at elapsed duration t). Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the idea. Solving (3.11) for F0,C
yields F0,C = (F0 − F0,NP0,N)/P0,C. Hence, in order to identify F0,C it is sufficient to identify
F0,P0,C,P0,N and F0,N. We can directly link F0 to observable outcomes at elapsed duration
t: it is equal to the average observed outcome at t of the whole not-yet-treated group,
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,Z = t′). Thus, F0 is identified. In addition, under assumptions
A1 − A4, we can identify P0,C,P0,N and F0,N from the treated group. In particular, due to
randomization and no-anticipation, all pre-treatment characteristics of the two groups
have equal distributions at elapsed duration t. It holds therefore P0,C = P1,C, P0,N = P1,N
and F0,N = F1,N. The intuition for the last equality is that in both groups noncompliers are
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(a) Setup I (b) Setup II
Figure 2. Identicition in the two setups
not treated. The exclusion restriction (2.1) ensures that the assignment to treatment alone
does not change their outcomes.
With these considerations we can state our main identification result:
Proposition 3.2. Let a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, the treatment effect on the treated
TE(t, t′, a) is nonparametrically identified for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 and it holds
(3.12) TE(t, t′, a) = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t)
Expression (3.12) has an intuitive interpretation. It adjusts the difference between the
average observed outcomes in the two groups by the probability to be a complier. The
adjustment takes account of the fact, that any difference between the outcomes of the two
groups can be caused only by the compliers. Our result is related to the static one-sided
noncompliance result of Bloom (1984) and the LATE identification result in Imbens and
Angrist (1994). Identification is local in the sense, that the treatment effect is identified
only for the subgroup of t-compliers. As this group is allowed to change with t, our notion
of location can be seen as a dynamic extension of the LATE notion of location.
We now consider the case of right censoring. In labor market context, right censoring
typically arises when at the end of the period of observation some individuals are still
unemployed, so their unemployment spells have an unknown length. Censoring occurs
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also when unemployment is interrupted by a transition out of the labor force due to
maternity, sickness and military service, or simply when individuals do not show up
to report about their status (attrition). With a small abuse of notation, let C ≥ 0 be the
censoring r.v.. Define T̃ = min{T,C} and δ = 1{T̃ = T}. We observe (T̃, δ) and not directly
(T,C). It is not possible to recover nonparametrically the joint distribution of T and C from
the distribution of (T̃, δ) without additional assumptions, see Tsiatis (1975). We adopt the
following additional standard assumption:
Assumption A5 (Random censoring). C ⊥ (T,S) ∣ X,Z.
It holds the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Under assumptions A1 - A5 TE(t,a) is identified.
Remarks.7. Identification of a treatment effect on the hazard (HTE) requires only mild
additional regularity assumption and is left for the appendix, section . 8. Under A1-A4,
we have P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′′) for all t′, t′′ ≥ t + a
(in the limit case a→ 0 simply for t′, t′′ > t). As a consequence, the treatment effect does not
depend on the choice of the nontreated cohort t′ as long as t′ ≥ t + a (or t′ > t). Therefore,
we omit the dependence on t′ and write TE(t, a) and HTE(t).
3.3. Identification in a Regression Discontinuity setup. In this section, we outline an
identification approach that mitigates the problems related to Setup I discussed in remark
6.17 The intuition is that if t′ is sufficiently close to t, t < t′, then treatment and control
cohorts are practically evaluated in the same economic environment. This consideration
leads to the following modifications of A2 and A3:
Assumption A2’: P(T(t) > t ∣ X) = limt′→t+ P(T(t′) > t ∣ X),
Assumption A3’: Denote by FT(s),S(z)∣Z,X,V and FV∣Z,X the corresponding conditional distri-
butions. Then there exist a positive number η, such that for all t’ in the η-neighbourhood
17 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this strategy to us.
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of t and for all positive (s, z)
(i)FT(s),S(z)∣Z=t,X,V = FT(s),S(z)∣Z=t′,X,V and (ii)FV∣Z=t,X = FV∣Z=t′,X.
Assumptions A2’ and A3’ are local versions of A2 and A3, respectively. Note that A2’ is
almost trivially fulfilled in both empirical Setups. In particular, even if an individual has
perfect knowledge of the assigned treatment (t or t′), the effect of this knowledge under t
and t′ will be the same when t′ → t+.
Let θ(. ∣ X,Z) be the conditional hazard function of T and assume the mild regularity
condition HTE1 (see section A in the appendix for a formal definition of the hazard and
for assumption HTE1). The following proposition can now be stated.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that limt′→t+ θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′) exists. Then, under assumptions A1, A2’,
A3’, A4, A5 and HTE1, the treatment effect on the hazard at t is identified and equal to
(3.13) ΨRD(t) = lim
t′→t+ θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) − θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′)P{S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t} .
(3.13) is related to the static Regression Discontinuity (RD) identification result in Hahn
et al. (2001). Z can be seen as a forcing variable with a discontinuity is at t. Assumption A3’
is related to the conditional independence assumption made in Theorem 2 in Hahn et al.
(2001). Assumption A2’, however, is new and needed to account for dynamic selection.
Thus, an estimator of the treatment effect based on A2’, A3’ and result (3.13) can be
interpreted as a dynamic RD estimator.
We do not implement this approach in our empirical application due to a practical
problem. In particular, the finite sample performance of the estimator might lack precision
due to lack of observations near the boundary. It is out of the scope of this paper to deal
with this problem. In addition, note that if the treatment effect does not substantiate
instantaneously, it will not be detected by the estimator.
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4. Estimation
In this section, we develop an estimator for TE(t, a). An estimator for the treatment effect
on the hazard is presented in section A.2 in the appendix. For simplicity of exposition,
we ignore the dependence on covariates. All results below generalize in a straightfor-
ward way to the case with covariates. One simply uses the conditional Kaplan-Meier
estimator of Gonzalez-Manteiga and Cadarso-Suarez (2007) instead of its unconditional
counterpart.
Let t < t′. Define F¯1(t) = P{T > t ∣ Z = t}, F¯2(t) = P{T > t ∣ Z = t′} and p = P{S = t ∣ T ≥ t,Z =
t}. The former two are observed survival probabilities and the latter is the compliance
probability. Under A1-A4, TE(t, a) can be written as
(4.1) TE(t, a) = 1
p
( F¯2(t + a)
F¯2(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) ).
Furthermore, we allow T to be right censored, and we assume that we have access to
i.i.d. observations (T˜i, δi,Si,Zi), i = 1, . . . ,n.Denote by ̂¯jF the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier
estimator of F¯ j, j = 1,2. Consider the following high level assumptions:
̂¯
jF(t) = F¯ j(t) + op(1),(4.2) √
n ( ̂¯jF(t) − F¯ j(t)) d→ N(0, σ2j(t)) as n→∞,(4.3)
where σ2j(t) is the asymptotic variance of the Kaplan-Meier estimator, t ∈ [0,∞), see e.g.
page 18 ff. Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). These conditions follow from mild regularity
conditions that can be found in standard references for survival analysis, see e.g. Andersen
et al. (1997), chapter IV.3 or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), chapter 5.6. We do not state
them explicitly. Finally, let p̂ be a consistent nonparametric estimator of p. With those
preliminaries, we define the IV-estimator T̂E(t, a) of TE(t, a) as
(4.4) T̂E(t, a) = 1
p̂
( ̂¯F2(t + a)̂¯F2(t) −
̂¯F1(t + a)̂¯F1(t) ).
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(4.4) can be interpreted as a dynamic version of a Wald estimator. Its consistency is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose (4.2) holds. Then, under assumptions A1-A5, it holds
T̂E(t, a) − TE(t, a) = op(1).
The following proposition states the asymptotic distribution of the estimator.
Proposition 4.2. Let assumptions A1-A5 and condition (4.3) hold. Then it holds
(4.5)√
n(T̂E(t, a) − TE(t, a)) d→ N(0, 1
p2
2∑
i=1 ( 1F¯2i (t)σi(t + a) + F¯
2
i (t + a)
F¯4i (t) σi(t) + F¯i(t + a)F¯3i (t) σi(t, t + a))),
where σi(t, t + a) is the covariance of ̂¯iF(t) and ̂¯iF(t + a).
Confidence bands can be constructed by replacing the unknown terms in the variance
with consistent estimates, for example using the Greenwood’s formula, see Andersen
et al. (1997). It follows from (4.5) that the precision of the estimator is inversely related to
p. The bigger the compliance probability p (i.e. the stronger the instrument Z), the smaller
the variance.
5. Model diagnostics
5.1. Testing the assumptions. We suggest two testing approaches to address the main
assumptions A2 and A3.
Pre-treatment approach. The first approach parallels model diagnostics in a DiD context
and focuses on pre-treatment outcomes. Empirical tests for equality of pre-treatment
survival probabilities are applied by De Giorgi (2005) and Van den Berg et al. (2014). In
this section, we give a theoretical justification for these tests. Let s ≤ t < t′. Under A1, A4,
assumptions A2 and A3 jointly imply
(5.1) P(T > s ∣ X,Z = t) = P(T > s ∣ X,Z = t′).
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In words, observed survival probabilities are equal in the treated and nontreated groups
at any common elapsed pre-treatment duration. Adopting A1 and A4 as fundamental
assumptions, equality (5.1) can be used to test for no anticipation and randomization.
This is captured in the following proposition (dependency on X is ignored).
Proposition 5.1. Let assumptions A1, A4, A5 and condition (4.3) hold. Then, under the null
hypothesis H0 ∶ A2 ∪A3, it holds
(5.2)
√
N(̂¯F1(t) − ̂¯F2(t)) a∼N(0,2σ2(t)).
RD approach The second approach is to adopt the weaker assumptions A2’ and A3’
(together with A1, A4, and A5) as fundamental and use (3.13) in a DiD setup. Let s > t.
Then under A2 and A3, the expression
(5.3) (θ(t ∣ X,Z = t)−θ(t ∣ X,Z = s))−(θ(t ∣ X,Z = t)− lim
t′→t+θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′)) = limt′→t+θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′)−θ(t ∣ X,Z = s)
is equal to 0. A test statistic can be constructed along the lines of section A.2 in the
appendix.
5.2. Framework for the analysis of endogeneity. A comprehensive policy reform is
often preceded by a small scale pilot study that allows for noncompliance, see e.g. Todd
(2007). Understanding the non-take up of the pilot study might help better design the
reform and derive bounds for its effect under perfect compliance. The motivation of our
analysis is that the individuals might select into treatment based on potential outcomes,
Heckman (2008). Therefore, one approach to analyze noncompliance is to test for equality
of potential outcomes. In particular, for some t < t′, we are interested in testing
(5.4) (i)F0,C = F0,N and (ii)F1,C = F1,N,
where we used the simplified notation from section 3.2. It follows from assumption A1
that F1,N is not identified: t−noncompliers are never observed under the treatment t. As
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a result, hypothesis (5.4) (ii) is not testable. We therefore focus on (5.4) (i). It follows
from relation (3.11) that hypothesis (5.4) (i) is equivalent to F0 = F0,N. In particular, if
compliers and noncompliers have equal (average) potential outcome distributions, then
the outcome distribution of the whole population under no treatment is equal to the
outcome distribution of the noncompliers under no treatment. Furthermore, we showed
in section 3.2 that F0 and F0,N are identified under A1-A4, with
F0 = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′),
F0,N = F1,N = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t).
These considerations lead to the testable hypothesisD = 0, where
D = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t).
D is the difference of the observed outcome distributions of the not-yet-treated and the
noncompliers from the treated group. The test statistic is constructed along the lines of
section 4.18
The bias that arises from an endogenous non-take up can be measured as the difference
between the true treatment effect (3.12), TE = F1,C − F0,C, and the naive candidate (3.5) (for
short NTE), NTE = F1,C−F1,N (dependence on t and a is suppressed). DefineB = TE−NTE.
Substituting F0,C = (F0 − F0,NPN)/PC and F0,N = F1,N yields B = (F0,N − F0)/PC = D/PC.
An empirical analysis of the bias from endogenous selection can be performed with an
estimator of B.
18 A simplified testing procedure would induce a comparison of unconditional survival functions. The
corresponding null hypothesis is
(5.5) H̃0 ∶ P(T ≥ t ∣ X,Z = t′) − P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t) = 0.
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6. Empirical Application: the French PARE labor market reform in 2001
In this section, we illustrate our methods in the context of the French labor market
reform Plan d’Aide au Retour a´ l’Emploi, PARE for short (example I).19 Under the old
system (prior July 1st 2001), the amount of individual unemployment benefits (UB) is a
stepwise decreasing function of time. Under the new regime (post July 1st 2001), the UB
are constant over the whole payment period of an eligible individual. In addition, the
reform introduces a range of ALMPs such as compulsory meetings with a case worker and
job search training.20 The more generous UB rules and the new ALMPs have potentially
opposite effects on the duration of unemployment. Thus, ex ante it is not clear what the
overall effect of the policy will be.
A distinct feature of the reform is that interrupted spells - i.e. those individuals who
became unemployed prior to July 1st and were still unemployed on that day - could
choose between the old and the new regulations. New spells (whose inflow is after July
1st 2001) were automatically assigned to the new system.
We evaluate the effect of the reform on the duration of unemployment for those who
have been unemployed for at least t = 6 months.21 Thus, the theoretical treatment effect of
interest is defined as
(6.1) TE(6, a) = P(T(6) ∈ [6,6 + a) ∣ T(6) ≥ 6) − P(T(t′) ∈ [6,6 + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ 6),
where t′ > 6 and a < t′ − t.22
19 Some studies that evaluate the French unemployment insurance system are e.g. Fouge`re et al. (2010),
Debauche and Jugnot (2007), Cre´pon et al. (2012), Cre´pon et al. (2005) and Le Barbanchon (2012).
20 A comprehensive description of the reform can be found in Freyssinet (2002).
21 We describe the dataset and our empirical strategy (and in particular the motivation behind our choice
of the treated cohort) in section B.1 in the appendix.
22 We use here corollary 3.1 to simplify the expression for the treatment effect.
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(a) TE and NTE (b) ̂¯1F(t) − ̂¯2F(t)
Figure 3. (a): Estimated treatment effect (thick line), 95% confidence bounds (dotted line),
Naive treatment effect (dashed line). (b): Difference of pre-treatment survival functions
(thick line), 95% confidence bounds (dotted line), the zero axis (dashed line).
The estimated treatment effect is presented in figure 3a for the choice t′ = 9 months of the
control group and different values of a ∈ [0,90) (t′ − t = 3 months = 90 days). The estimate
TˆE(6, a) is represented by a thick line, and the 95 %-confidence bounds are represented by
dotted lines. The effect is positive and increasing with a, and for a ≥ 37 it is also significant.
According to our estimates, the probability to find a job within the first three months after
receiving the treatment increased with up to 0.2 compared to the counterfactual case
where the treated would not have received the treatment. In section B.2 in the appendix,
we present results for different subgroups in order to analyze potential treatment effect
heterogeneity. The estimates for the subgroups of white and blue collar workers, and for
the subgroups of unemployed with higher and lower education status follow a pattern
very similar to the pattern of the unconditional estimates.
Next, we perform thorough model diagnostics. First, chi-square tests for equality of
distributions reveal that pre-treatment observed characteristics are balanced between the
treatment and control groups, see appendix B.3.1. Second, we also provide evidence that
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the economic condition at the inflow of the two cohorts were very similar, also in appendix
B.3.1. These findings support the plausibility of A3, and in particular that the estimates
are not undermined by cohort effects. Third, we estimate the TE with an alternative choice
of the control cohort (t′′ = 8 months). The estimation results are very similar to the main
results, see figure 6 in the appendix. This is further evidence that there were no cohort
effects. In section B.3.2, we provide arguments that the reform was not anticipated to the
unemployed due to the relative short notice and lack of (clear) political debate. Fourth,
we test for equality of pre-treatment survival functions along the lines of section 5.1. The
estimated difference of the survival functions of treatment and control groups is depicted
in figure 3b with a thick line. The zero axis lies is fully contained within the 95% confidence
bounds. Therefore, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis (A2, A3).
Finally, we analyse the non-take up of the reform (noncompliance) along the lines of
section 5.2. To do so, we compare the IV estimate TˆE(6, a) with an estimate of the NTE
(3.5), see the dashed line in figure 3a. At all points at which the TE is positive, the estimated
NTE is smaller than the corresponding estimated TE. The difference is significant at the
95% level.
Based on these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the policy reform
increased the transition rate out of unemployment. Economically, our finding contributes
to a better understanding of the relative response of individuals to monetary vs. non-
monetary incentives. Second, ignoring endogeneity that arises from noncompliance leads
to a negative bias in the estimates. The main implication here is that there are many good
risks among the noncompliers. Thus, it is plausible to conclude that the non-take up of
the reform is driven by individuals who expect to soon find a job. This finding supports
the non-take up analysis by Blasco (2009).
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Appendix A. Identification and estimation of additive treatment effects on the
hazard
Denote with θT(s)(t ∣ X,V) the hazard of T(s) at t for an individual with characteristics
X and V, θ(t ∣ X,V) ∶= limdt→0 P(T ∈ [t, t + dt ∣ T ≥ t,X,V))/dt (all expressions are assumed
to exist). Then the individual additive treatment effect on the hazard at t is defined as
(A.1) θT(t)(t ∣ X,V) − θT(t′)(t ∣ X,V),
where t′ > t. Similarly to the case with the conditional survival function, the average
treatment effect on the hazard (HTE) is defined as
HTE(t, t′) ∶= E[θT(t)(t ∣ S(t) = t,X,V) −(A.2)
θT(t′)(t ∣ S(t) = t,X,V) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,S(t) = t,X].
In this subsection, we state conditions under which HTE is identified. We also develop
the estimation theory. The HTE deserves a special attention for two reasons. First, the
hazard of the duration variable represents the most interesting feature of its distribution
in multiple applications, see Van den Berg (2001) for various examples and a discussion.
Second, estimation of hazard effects in a treatment evaluation framework involves esti-
mation at the boundary of the admissible domain. We develop an estimator that takes
into account the region of estimation and does not lead to an increased bias.
A.1. Identification. Write W = (X,V) and let ΩW be the set of possible values for W.
Further, write Ψ(t ∣ X) ∶= HTE(t,X). Again we assume access to an i.i.d. sample
(T̃1,S1,Z1,X1, δ1), . . . , (T̃n,Sn,Zn,Xn, δn).
The following mild technical assumption ensures that the order of taking the limit and
the expectation operator can be interchanged.
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Assumption HTE1. There exists a measurable function g ∶ R+ × ΩW → R+ that fulfills
E[g(t,W)] <∞ and ∣ θ(t ∣ W = w) ∣≤ g(t,w) for each (t,w) ∈ R+ ×ΩW.
Identification is stated in the following result.
Proposition A.1. Under assumptions A1-A5 and HTE1, Ψ(t ∣ X) is identified and it holds
(A.3) Ψ(t ∣ X) ∶= θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) − θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) .
HTE is the limit case of the general treatment effect TE, HTE = lima→0TE/dt.
A.2. Estimation. Henceforth, we denote with θ1(t ∣ X) the hazard θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) of the
younger cohort , {Z = t}, and with θ2(t ∣ X) the hazard θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′) of the older cohort. If
the treatment is effective, then there will be a jump in the hazard function at the moment
of treatment (per definition). Hence, when estimating Ψ(t ∣ X), only the observations T̃
that are bigger than or equal to t are informative about θ1(t ∣ X).23 This leads to estimating
a hazard at the left boundary of the interval [t, T¯) where T¯ is some maximum duration,
possibly ∞. Smooth hazard estimators that use a symmetric kernel would have a large
bias at t, a problem called boundary effect in the literature, Mu¨ller and Wang (1994).
Without loss of generality, let [0,1] be the set of possible values of the duration variable
and b = b(n) a bandwidth of a kernel estimator, b < 0.5. The set BL ∶= {t ∶ 0 ≤ t < b} is called
a left boundary region (we do not discuss problems arising at the right boundary here).
Employing a symmetric kernel to estimate the hazard at a point from that region could
lead to a high bias, because the support of the kernel exceeds the range of the data. In the
interior (0,1), this is only a finite sample problem. At the boundary t = 0, the problem
persists with increasing sample size n. Boundary problems are not endemic to hazards,
they arise also in the estimation of a density function, see Karunamuni and Alberts (2005).
Mu¨ller and Wang (1994) develop a class of asymmetric kernels and use them to adapt the
23This does not apply to θ2(t ∣ X).
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unconditional Ramlau-Hansen estimator to the boundary case. The kernels vary with the
point of estimation and have a support that does not exceed the range of the duration
variable. These kernels are referred to as boundary kernels. Following this approach, we
adapt the conditional kernel hazard estimator of Nielsen and Linton (1995) to the case of
estimation at the boundary by using boundary kernels. For simplicity, we assume that
we estimate Ψ(t ∣ x) at an interior point x of ΩX. Let k be a symmetric one-dimensional
continuous density function with support [−1,1], that is
∫ 1−1 k(y)dy = 1 and ∫ 1−1 yk(y)dy = 0
and define k1 and k2 as
k1 = ∫ 1−1 y2k(y)dy and k2 = ∫ 1−1 k2(y)dy.
Define the q-dimensional product kernel K(x) = Πqi=1k(x(i)), where x = (x(1), . . . ,x(q)).
Next, let k+ denote the asymmetric kernel function
k+ ∶ [0,1] × [−1,1]→ R
(h, y)→ 12(1 + h)4 (y + 1)[y(1 − 2h) + (3h2 − 2h + 1)/2].
This is a boundary kernel function as defined in Mu¨ller and Wang (1994).24 The support
of k+(h, .) is [−1,h]. In analogy to the symmetric kernel k, we define the second moments
of k+(0, .) as
k+1 = ∫ 0−1 y2k+(0, y)dy and k+2 = ∫ 0−1 k2+(0, y)dy.
Using standard counting processes notation, define for i = 1, . . . ,n the observed failure
process of the ith individual at time t, Ni(t) ∶= 1{T̃i ≤ t,Ti ≤ Ci} and the individual process
at risk, Yi(t) ∶= 1{T̃i ≥ t}. To differentiate between observations from the cohorts 1, that
is {Z = t}, and 2, that is {Z = t′}, we add a subscript 1 or 2, respectively. For example,
24 An alternative approach could be to use the boundary kernels by Cattaneo et al. (2017).
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X1,i denotes an observation of X that comes from the cohort {Z = t}. Then our estimator
Ψ̂(t ∣ x) of Ψ(t ∣ x) is defined as
Ψ̂(t ∣ x) ∶= 1
pˆ1(t ∣ x)( ∑
n
i=1 K(x−X1,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN1,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X1,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y1,i(s)ds(A.4)
− ∑ni=1 K(x−X2,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN2,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X2,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y2,i(s)ds),
where pˆ1(t ∣ x) is a nonparametric estimator for p1(t ∣ x) ∶= P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X = x,Z = t).
We assume that pˆ1(t ∣ x) is consistent. In addition, for proposition A.2 ii) we assume
that b−2(pˆ1(t ∣ x) − p1(t ∣ x)) = op(1), which can be assured by assuming that p1(t ∣ x) is
sufficiently smooth in x. The term
θˆ j(t ∣ x) ∶= ∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN j,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y j,i(s)ds
for j = 1,2 is a conditional smooth hazard estimator for θ j(t ∣ x) developed in Nielsen and
Linton (1995) and adapted to the boundary case. Define
(A.5) θ∗j (t ∣ x) ∶= ∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )θ j(s ∣ X j,i)Y j,i(s)ds∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y j,i(s)ds j = 1,2
and
(A.6) Ψ∗(t ∣ x) = 1
pˆ1(t ∣ x)(θ∗1(t ∣ x) − θ∗2(t ∣ x)).
We need the following assumptions.
H1 E[Yi(s)] = u(s) and u(.) is continuous
H2 i) f (x)u(t) is positive on a neighborhood U of (0,x0) ∈ R+ × ΩX, where x0 is
an interior point of ΩX and f is the density of X. ii) θ j is twice continuously
differentiable on U. iii) f u is continuously differentiable on U.
H3 nbq+1 →∞ and b = b(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
The following proposition states the pointwise asymptotic properties of Ψ̂(0 ∣ x0).
NONPARAMETRIC IV METHODS FOR DYNAMIC TREATMENT EVALUATION 5
Proposition A.2. Define
σ2Ψ ∶= k+2 kq2 1p21(0 ∣ x0)(θ1(0 ∣ x0)/ f1(x0) + θ2(0 ∣ x0)/ f2(x0)).
Under assumptions H1-H3, the following results hold:
i)
√
nbq+1(Ψ̂(0 ∣ x0) −Ψ∗(0 ∣ x0)) d→ N[0, σ2Ψ].
ii) If in addition b−2(pˆ1(t ∣ x) − p1(t ∣ x)) = op(1), then
b−2(Ψ∗(0 ∣ x0) −Ψ(0 ∣ x0)) p→ 2∑
i=1
(−1)i+1k+1
fi(x0)ui(0)p1(0 ∣ x0)
[∂θi(0 ∣ x0)
∂t
∂( fi(x0)ui(0))
∂t
+ 1
2
∂2θi(0 ∣ x0)
∂t2
fi(x0)ui(0) +
q∑
j=1 (∂θi(0 ∣ x0)∂x( j) ∂( fi(x0)ui(0))∂x( j) + 12 ∂2θi(0 ∣ x0)∂x( j)2 fi(x0)ui(0))]
iii) Finally, it also holds
σˆ2Ψ ∶= nbq+1pˆ1(0 ∣ x0)
2 2∑
j=1
∑ni=1 K2(x0−X j,ib ) ∫ k2+(−sb )dN j,i(s)(∑ni=1 K(x0−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(−sb )Y j,i(s)ds)2 p→
σ2Ψ
Result i) gives the asymptotic distribution of the estimator, ii) characterizes the bias
and iii) provides the standard errors for confidence bounds around Ψ∗. If the bandwidth
is chosen to be of o(n−1/(q+5)), then the asymptotic bias is negligible and proposition A.2
can be used to construct confidence bands for Ψ.
Appendix B. Empirical application: data description and additional results
B.1. Dataset and empirical strategy. The dataset we use is constructed by matching two
administrative data sets: the Fichier Historique (FH) dataset, which contains information
about the unemployment spells and is issued by the French public employment agency
(Agence Nationale Pour L’emploi, ANPE), and the De´claration Anuelle de Donne´es So-
ciales (DADS) dataset, which contains the employment information of all individuals
employed in the private sector and is issued by the French Statistical Institute (INSEE).
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We extract a set of variables, rich enough to account for the socioeconomic status of the
individuals, namely age, gender, marital status, number of children, educational level,
professional experience, reason for entering unemployment, exit direction (out of unem-
ployment), and unemployment history. Details about the construction and content of the
variables are provided below in section B.4.
To preclude geographical heterogeneity we restrict our sample to the administrative
region Iˆle de France, which contains Paris and consists of the administrative departments
75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95. Because of its size and specific infrastructure, this region
might differ from the rest of France in terms of labor market dynamics (mobility, unem-
ployment structure, wages) and in terms of the implementation of the reform. Moreover,
the macroeconomic conditions in this region are stable over the period of consideration,
which ensures the comparability of the cohorts, see subsection B.3.1.
The choice of the cohorts is restricted by the available data. There is no administrative
variable that captures the compliance status of the unemployed. We develop a novel
approach to deal with this problem, which so far has not been adopted in other PARE
evaluation studies with register data. Specifically, we choose the younger (i.e., treated)
cohort {Z = t} such that its first due benefits reduction under the old system coincides
with the implementation of the reform. This enables us to observe the compliance status.25
Its inflow is six months before the start of PARE.26 The choice of the comparison cohort
(the untreated) is more flexible as we do not need to observe the compliance. The main
25One may also consider subsequent elapsed durations at which declines take place, but this would be
at the cost of having fewer observations.
26The time length from inflow until the day of the first decline can vary somewhat, depending on
characteristics of the unemployed, such as number of working days in the last twelve months and age; see
Freyssinet (2002) for details. We stop the duration clock on days on which the individual worked part-time
during their unemployment spell. Excluding them does not affect the results. We also exclude elderly
unemployed.
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concern is to prevent cohort effects. Business cycles or mass layoffs due to bankruptcies
of large firms are examples for possible causes for structural changes in the inflow over
time. We choose the comparison cohort to have entered unemployment 3 months earlier
than the treated cohort because then both cohorts begin their unemployment spells in a
fairly economically stable time interval; see subsection B.3.1 for a discussion. This choice
has an implication for the time interval of comparison. Conditional on survival up to 6
months, one can compare the two cohorts only in an interval of 3 months. After the 3rd
month, the older cohort will also receive the treatment, and one would no longer compare
treated with untreated.
With these choices we end up with 537 (311) spells in the treated (comparison) cohort.
From these, 116 (76) are censored. In the treated cohort there are 250 compliers.
B.2. Treatment effect heterogeneity. In this section, we present estimation results on the
treatment effect for two different subgroups. In particular, figure 4a displays the estimates
for white versus blue collars, while figure 4b displays the results for higher (above high
school) and lower educated. Both figures reveal patterns that are very similar to the
(a) White vs Blue col-
lar (dashed)
(b) Low vs High edu-
cated (dashed)
Figure 4. Estimates conditional on qualification and education
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unconditional estimates in the paper.
B.3. Model diagnostics.
B.3.1. Cohort effects. In this subsection, we study the comparability of the cohorts. Co-
hort effects would violate the randomization assumption A3. Since T(s),S(t) and V are
unobserved, A3 cannot be tested directly. An indirect way to assess the plausibility of
A3, in addition to the joint test of A2 and A3 in the last section of the main paper, is (i)
to test whether pre-treatment characteristics are balanced at inflow and (ii) to assess the
macroeconomic conditions at the point in time of inflow of the two cohorts.
We first perform a chi-square test for equality of distributions of level of education, years
of experience, number of children, gender and pre-jobloss wages. The corresponding p-
values are 0.6037, 0.98, 0.5112, 0.581, and 0.34, which indicates that the differences between
these distributions are statistically insignificant. Second, the same test is performed also
for the layoff reasons. The null (equality of distributions) is rejected, but in this case this
could be due to the large number of categories and small number of observations in
each category. A histogram of aggregated categories indicates that the cohorts are indeed
similar, see figure 5a-5b. Third, the average level of unemployment in the administrative
region Iˆll de France in the first three quarters of 2001 is constant and equal to 6.4%, which
is evidence for a fairly stable macroeconomic environment. 27
Finally, we challenge the ”no cohort effects” assumption hidden in A3 with an alter-
native choice of a control cohort. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the estimates of the
treatment effect with two different control cohorts. The thick line is the estimate with the
9-months old cohort (3 months older than the treatment cohort), while the dashed line
displays an estimate with an 8-month old cohort (i.e. 2 months older than the treatment
cohort). The estimates are very similar. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the
27 Source: http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-donnees/bsweb
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(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 5. Histograms of layoff reasons
results are not sensitive with respect to the choice of the control, which is further evidence
for the plausibility of our assumptions.28
Figure 6. IV estimates with (i) 9-month-old cohort (thick line) and (ii) 8-
month-old-cohort (dashed line)
B.3.2. No anticipation. Next, the “no anticipation” assumption is fulfilled when individu-
als do not anticipate the moment in time of treatment or do not act upon this information,
see for a discussion Abbring and van den Berg (2003). Although it was known that a
reform is going to take place, there was a lot of debate and uncertainty over its content.
28 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this sensitivity analysis to us.
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Unemployed were informed about the exact content and launch date on the 18th of June
2001, that is, less than two weeks before the start of the program, so they had practically no
time to react upon this information, see Freyssinet (2002). Further, when an individual de-
cides to switch to the new system, the assignment to a specific treatment depends mostly
on the social worker in charge and on the slots available, so that the unemployed has no
knowledge of it in advance, see also Cre´pon et al. (2005). Combined with a very short time
span between assignment and launch of a treatment is very short, which precludes acting
upon the anticipation. In the main paper, we test for equality of pre-treatment outcomes,
which is an implication of (jointly) A2 and A3.
B.3.3. Dependent Censoring: a Simulation Study. The last important assumption is that of
independent censoring. It cannot be tested directly, as revealed by a nonidentification
result of Tsiatis (1975). Over 70% of all censored spells are attributed to the censoring
categories “no control”, “other cases” and “other termination of search”. There is no
further information for these cases.
We therefore assess the impact of the assumption of independent censoring in an
indirect way: we conduct a small simulation study. Deviations from C ⊥ S and C ⊥ T are
constructed, where C again is a censoring random variable. The first one influences the
estimator of the probability to be a complier,
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t),
while the second one influences the estimator of the difference
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′).
We are interested in their marginal impacts as well as in the influence of their interplay.
Two cohorts are simulated, the treated and the nontreated, each with 10000 individuals.
Both cohorts consist of compliers and noncompliers and in each cohort the probability to
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be a complier is 80%. Noncompliers dominate stochastically the compliers when both
groups have not received the treatment. This reflects our finding in section 5.2 that
noncompliance might occur due to the expectation of a short spell. The treatment is
obtained by the compliers of the first cohort on the 20th day after inflow and it shifts their
duration distribution from N(60,15) to N(30,10) in line with the estimation results from
section 629. The noncompliers are not influenced by the treatment and have a duration
distribution N(45,15). The compliers from the second cohort do not receive the treatment
too. Their duration distribution is equal to the duration distribution of the compliers
of cohort 1 before treatment, N(60,15). Figure 7 shows the theoretical treatment effect,
Figure 7. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20).
depicted by the thick black line. The dashed red line represents the IV estimator in a
case with independent censoring with a distribution N(40,10) (the second argument is
henceforth the standard deviation) . This is the benchmark estimator.
Next, a dependence of the censoring on the compliance is introduced. The different
choices of distributions are described in table 1.
29Negative values are replaced by their absolute values.
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Table 1. Simulation of dependences between censoring and compliance
Line description Censoring distribu-
tion compliers
Censoring distribu-
tion noncompliers
Green dashed line N(30,15) N(50,15)
Red dotted line N(30,15) N(40,15)
Blue long dashed line N(40,15) N(30,15)
Grey two dashed line N(50,15) N(30,15)
Notes: The second argument of the normal distribution is its standard deviation
The resulting estimators are shown in figure 8. The solid black line is theoretical effect.
The figure reveals the relationship between bias of the treatment effect and dependence
Figure 8. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20). The black solid line
is the theoretical treatment effect. Different curves correspond to different
dependences of censoring and compliance, see table 1. The solid black line
is theoretical effect.
of censoring and compliance. When the compliers are at higher risk of censoring, the
treatment effect is (a. e.) underestimated. The higher this discrepancy in the risk exposure,
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the bigger the bias. Similarly, when the noncompliers are at higher risk of censoring, the
treatment effect is overestimated.
Next, the relationship between bias and time dependence of the censoring is exploited.
We simulate three different levels of dependence. In all three cases long spells have a higher
risk of being censored than short spells. This is in line with typical situations in applied
survival analysis. For example, long term unemployed might have smaller incentives to
meet criteria (e. g. administrative control of search, regular visits at the agency, etc.) to
stay on an unemployment insurance list. The three specifications are defined in table 2.
Each row represents one specification.
Table 2. Simulation of dependences between censoring and time
Line description Censoring distribu-
tion T ≤ 40
Censoring distribu-
tion T > 40
Green dashed line N(40,20) N(30,20)
Red dotted line N(40,20) N(25,20)
Blue long dashed line N(40,20) N(20,20)
Notes: The second argument of the normal distribution is its standard deviation
The corresponding estimators are depicted in figure 9. Approximately until day 15
the IV estimator performs fairly well in all three cases. Afterwards it underestimates the
treatment effect. The bias increases in absolute value with increasing time dependence
(defined as the difference in the means in the two groups of spells).
It is interesting to simulate and analyze a combination of these two types dependence
patterns. We simulate four patterns of such an interplay. The concrete distributions are
described in table 3. The results are shown in figure 10. The blue and the grey lines are
closer to the theoretical effect than the other two estimators. This indicates, that a violation
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Figure 9. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20).The black solid line
is the theoretical treatment effect. Different curves correspond to different
dependence patters of censoring and time, see table 2. The solid black line
is theoretical effect.
Table 3. Simulation of dependences between censoring and compliance
and time
Line description K, T ≤ 30 K, T > 30 N, T ≤ 30 N, T ≤ 30
Green dashed line N(50,20) N(30,20) N(30,20) N(20,20)
Red dotted line N(40,20) N(30,20) N(30,20) N(20,20)
Blue two dashed line N(30,20) N(20,20) N(40,20) N(30,20)
Grey long dashed line N(30,20) N(20,20) N(50,20) N(30,20)
Notes: K stays for compliers, N for noncompliers.
in the censoring assumption C ⊥ S might partially offset a violation in the assumption
C ⊥ T. This is a novel result.
In the French labor market reform it is difficult to argue which type of dependence
there is likely to be. Noncompliers contain many quick exits, and if longer spells have a
higher censoring risk than shorter spells, than noncompliers should be less exposed to
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censoring than compliers. This would correspond to the fourth case of table 3. Thus the
simulation results provide evidence, that the IV estimator is robust to a violation in the
independent censoring assumption.
Figure 10. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20). The black solid line is the
theoretical effect in the absence of censoring. Different curves correspond
to different dependences of censoring and time, see table 2. The solid black
line is theoretical effect.
B.4. Description of variables. The variables used in our empirical application have been
constructed in the following way:
● The variable age gives the age at the begin of the unemployment spell and is
defined as the year in which the spells begins minus the year of birth.
● Marital status consists of four categories: single, married, divorced and widowed.
● the variable for educational level summarizes the 31 categories used in the ad-
ministrative data set into 6 categories according to the highest degree attained.
The correspondence is roughly as follows: value 1 if the degree is in niveau I and II
(university degree, maıˆtrise and licence), value 2 if the degree is in niveau III - BTS
and DUT (brevet de technicier supe´rieur and diploˆme univeritaire de technologie,
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respectively, both technical degrees obtained in 2 years after high school), value 3
for all Baccalaure´at (high school degree, the general part of lyce´e) diplomas and
for all dropouts from niveau III, 4 for all BEP ,CEP (professional Baccalaure´at,
specialised part of lyce´e) and all dropouts from Baccalaure´at, 5 for BEPC (brevet
d’e´tudes du premier cycle, junior high school), and 6 for below.
● The variable experience states the number of years of experience in the job (type
and position), which the individual is looking for. The types of jobs are specified
in an administrative nomenclature table (ROME table). There are several hundred
different types.
● The job type variable contains general information about the type of the activity
in the job preceding the current unemployment spell. It summarizes the 9 admin-
istrative categories into 6 categories: white collar skilled, white collar unskilled,
technical, supervisor (a production team leader) and manager. This summarized
categorization is in line with existing literature, see for example ?. The initial
administrative variable is contained in the FH data set. This holds also for the vari-
able, which states which job is the unemployed looking for, while the following
employment type and position is contained in the DADS data set. Unfortunately,
there is no clear matching between the variables from the two different data sets,
which leads to some unclarity regarding the question whether the unemployed
actually found the job he/she was looking for. This restricts our definition of cen-
soring. Therefore, in this application each observation with known job destination
is considered uncensored.
● Censoring indicator: there are several possibilities, when an observation is con-
sidered as censored. These are:
– when the unemployment spell in the data set is not finished at the time of the
data collection, or
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– when the individual exits the labor market. This includes exits to maternity,
accident, illness or invalidity, invalidity pension, military service, administra-
tive change of insurance status, attrition because of insufficient administrative
control, dropout because of irregular notifications, and other, unspecified rea-
sons. While reasons such as maternity, military services and invalidity pension
are normally known well in advance by the unemployed and can therefore be
related to search activity (as well as to compliance behavior), they represent a
small fraction of the observations.
● Unemployment history: it is constructed as a binary variable which equals 1 if
the individual had been already unemployed before the last employment spell.
There are various ways to define unemployment history. One example is the total
length of previous unemployment spells. Alternatively, one could take the num-
ber of unemployment spells, or both. All possibilities suffer from disadvantages.
The last possibility seems to provide the most complete information, but it also
demands more data, since it provides many different categories. The total length
of previous unemployment lacks any information about the lengths of the sep-
arate spells, and the number of spells alone doesn’t give any information about
the length of unemployment. The binary indicator also does not provide any in-
formation at all about the dispersion of previous unemployment, but it is easy
to understand and requires only two categories, which makes it computationally
attractive. Additional, more serious drawback for the other two indicators is, that
the data set is left censored: the earliest information about employment is from
1993. This problem is less severe, if one only looks at the indicator of having been
unemployed.
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Appendix C. Proofs of propositions
C.1. Proofs of propositions in section 3.2.
Proof of proposition 3.1. First we show that from the no anticipation assumption the fol-
lowing result holds:
(C.1) P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t).
This is so because
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) = exp(−ΘT(t)(t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V))
No anticipation= exp(−ΘT(t′)(t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V)) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V),
so that we obtain
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = IE [I{T(t)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t]
= IE [IE [I{T(t)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t,V] ∣ X,S(t) = t]
= IE [P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) ∣ X,S(t) = t]
= IE [P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) ∣ X,S(t) = t]
= IE [IE [I{T(t′)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t,V] ∣ X,S(t) = t] = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t)
where I{T(s)∈B} is an indicator function equal to 1 when T(s) ∈ B (of course from these steps
we also see that P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V)).
Next, using result (C.1), we show FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T(t′)≥t,X,S(t)=t. Let B be a Borel set.
With result (C.1), it holds
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).
Now we show FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T≥t,X,S=t,Z=t. First we observe that Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X,V
and Z y V ∣ X together imply Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X (Weak Union, see Pearl (2000)). Then,
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we have
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t)P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V ∈ B)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) .
We study the separate components of the right-hand side of the last expression.
(1) With assumptions A3 and A4, it holds
P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t).
(2) Further,
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V ∈ B) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,V ∈ B,Z = t).
(3) Using Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X instead of Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X,V, we obtain
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)
So finally we get the equality
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
= P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,V ∈ B,Z = t)
P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)
= P(V ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t)

Proof of corollary 3.1. With proposition 3.1,
TE(t, t′, a) = IE[P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t]
− IE[P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t]
= P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) − P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).

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Lemma C.1. Set B = [t, t + a) where a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all
∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 that
(C.2)
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t),
(C.3)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) =∞) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t) and
(C.4)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′).
Proof of Lemma C.1. First, observe that with randomization and consistency, it holds
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t),
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t),
so that
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t)
where the r.h.s of the equality consists only of observables.
Next, we have
P(T ∈ B ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t) = P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t)
= P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞,Z = t) = P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞)
= P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞),
where the first and the second equalities follow due to consistency, the third due to
randomization and the fourth due to no anticipation. Equality (C.4) follows analogically.

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Lemma C.2. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 that
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X) = P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t),(C.5)
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X).(C.6)
Proof of Lemma C.2. First, it holds
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ S = t,X,Z = t)P(S = t ∣ X,Z = t)
P(T ≥ t ∣ X,Z = t)
= P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X) = P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X),
where the second equality follows with assumptions A1-A4.
Next,
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(S(t) = t,T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X)
P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X)
= P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X) = P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X)
= P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X),
where the second equality holds due to no anticipation. 
Proof of proposition 3.2. First, write
P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X)(C.7)
= P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X)
+ P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) =∞)P(S(t) =∞ ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X),
and then express P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) in terms of the other three
components of equality (C.7). Plugging in the results of lemma C.1 and lemma C.2, we
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obtain for FC,0 ∶= P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
= P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) − P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t,S =∞)P(S =∞ ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) .
Finally, with FC,1 ∶= P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t), the treatment effect is equal to FC,1−FC,0
which after simplification is equal to
P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) .

Proof of proposition 3.3. First, note that P(T ∈ [t, t+ a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) = 1− P(T≥t+a∣X,Z=t)P(T≥t∣X,Z=t) . Each
of the survival functions on the r.h.s can be consistently estimated with a Kaplan-Meier
estimator. Thus, P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) is identified. Identification of
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′)
is shown analogously. Finally, under the independent right-censoring assumption, it holds
(C.8) P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t,C ≥ t) = P(S = t ∣ T̃ ≥ t,X,Z = t).
The expression on the r.h.s contains only observables and is also identified. This completes
the proof. 
Proof of proposition 3.4. First, note that under assumptions A1, A2’, A3’, A4, A5, propo-
sition 3.1 holds locally (i.e. for t′ ≥ t with t′ in a η-neighborhood of t). Then, locally, the
treatment effect on the hazard is identified due to proposition A.1. The result of proposi-
tion 3.4 follows by taking the limit t′ → t+ of the expression Ψ. 
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C.2. Proofs of propositions in section 4. This result follows directly from the continu-
ity of the function G(a, b, c,d, e) = 1e( ab − cd), the Continuous Mapping Theorem and the
consistency of F¯i(t) and p̂.
Define the null hypothesis
(C.9) H0 ∶ (Ineffective treatment) F¯2(t + a)F¯2(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) = 0.
Under (C.9), it holds
√
nT̂E(t, a) = √n
p̂
(̂¯2F(t + a)̂¯
2F(t) −
̂¯
1F(t + a)̂¯
1F(t) ) =
= √n
p̂
(̂¯2F(t + a)̂¯
2F(t) − F¯2(t + a)F¯2(t) ) −
√
n
p̂
(̂¯1F(t + a)̂¯
1F(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) )
For i = 1,2 the Taylor expansion of ̂¯iF(t+a)̂¯
iF(t) around F¯i(t+a)F¯i(t) can be written aŝ¯
iF(t + a)̂¯
iF(t) = F¯i(t + a)F¯i(t) + 1F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) − F¯i(t + a)F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))+O[( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a))( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t)) + ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))2],
and therefore
√
n( ̂¯iF(t + a)̂¯
iF(t) − F¯i(t + a)F¯i(t) ) =
√
n
F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) − F¯i(t + a)
√
n
F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t)−F¯i(t)) +O[√n( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a))( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t)) + √n( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))2].
The last term converges to zero in probability.
With (4.3), the terms
√
n
F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) and F¯i(t + a)
√
n
F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))
are asymptotically normally distributed with mean 0 and variances
1
F¯2i (t)σi(t + a) and F¯
2
i (t + a)
F¯4i (t) σi(t), respectively.
The proof of the proposition follows then from the independence of the random variables
D1 and D2, where Di = ̂¯iF(t+a)̂¯
iF(t) , i = 1,2.
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C.3. Proofs of propositions in section A of the appendix.
Proof of proposition A.1. Under the Lebesque dominated convergence theorem,
θ(t ∣ X) = lim
dt→0E[P(T ∈ [t, t + dt) ∣ T ≥ t,X,V)/dt ∣ T ≥ t,X] = E[θ(t ∣ X,V)],
and the proof follows directly from proposition 3.2. 
Proof of proposition A.2. For notational simplicity we drop the dependence on 0 and x0.
First note, that the results of Theorem 1 Nielsen and Linton (1995) remain valid at the
boundary when we replace the symmetric kernel k with its boundary counterpart k+ and
adapt the constants. The validity of proposition A.2 i) follows from
√
nbq+1((Ψ̂ − Ψ∗) =√
nbq+1
p̂1
((θ̂1 −θ∗1)− (θ̂2 −θ∗2)), the independence of (θ̂1 −θ∗1) and (θ̂2 −θ∗2), and the adapted
proof of Theorem 1 i) in Nielsen and Linton (1995). Next, it holds
(C.10) b−2(Ψ∗ −Ψ) = b−2
p̂1
((θ∗1 − θ1) − (θ∗2 − θ2)) + b−2(θ1 − θ2)( 1p̂1 − 1p1 ).
The second term on the right-hand side of (C.10) is equal to op(1) when b is of order
O(n−1/(q+5)) or o(n−1/(q+5)). Proposition A.2 ii) follows with Theorem 1 b) in Nielsen and
Linton (1995). Finally, proposition A.2 iii) follows directly from the adapted proof of
Theorem 1 c) Nielsen and Linton (1995) and the continuous mapping theorem. 
C.4. Proofs of propositions in section 5.
Proof of proposition 5.1. First, ignoring X, note that due to proposition 3.1, the equality (3.2)
implies the equality
(C.11) P(T(t) > s) = P(T(t′) > s).
With assumptions A3 and A4, (C.11) is equivalent to
P(T > s ∣ Z = t) = P(T > s ∣ Z = t′).
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Then, under condition (4.3), the estimators of each of the two probabilities is normally
distributed with a variance σ2(t). 
References
Abbring, J. H. and van den Berg, G. J. (2003). The non-parametric identification of
treatment effects in duration models. Econometrica, 71(5):1491–1517.
Abbring, J. H. and van den Berg, G. J. (2005). Social experiments and instrumental
variables with duration outcomes. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05 - 047/3,
Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands.
Andersen, P., Borgan, Ø., Gill, R., and Keiding, N. (1997). Statistical Models Based on
Counting Processes. Springer Series in Statistics. Springer New York.
Biewen, M., Fitzenberger, B., Osikominu, A., and Paul, M. (2014). The effectiveness of
public-sponsored training revisited: the importance of data and methodological choices.
Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4):837–897.
Bijwaard, G. (2008). Instrumental variable estimation for duration data. Tinbergen Insti-
tute Discussion Paper 08-032/4, Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands.
Bijwaard, G. and Ridder, G. (2005). Correcting for selective compliance in a re-employment
bonus experiment. Journal of Econometrics, 125:77–111.
Blasco, S. (2009). Do people forgo extra money to avoid job search assistance? Discussion
paper, CREST, Paris, France.
Bloom, H. S. (1984). Estimating the effect of job-training programs, using longitudinal
data: Ashenfelter’s findings reconsidered. The journal of human resources, 19:544–556.
Blundell, R., Dias, M. C., Meghir, C., and Reenen, J. (2004). Evaluating the employment
impact of a mandatory job search program. Journal of the European Economic Association,
2(4):569–606.
26 GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG∗, PETYO BONEV†, ENNO MAMMEN‡
Carney, T. and Ramia, G. (2011). Welfare support and sanctions for noncompliance in
a recessionary world labour market: Post-Neoliberalism or not? Technical Report 11,
Sydney Law School.
Cattaneo, M. D., Jansson, M., and Ma, X. (2017). Simple local polynomial density estima-
tors. Working paper, University of Michigan, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Chesher, A. (2002). Semiparametric identification in duration models. CeMMAP working
paper CWP20/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, London, UK.
Cre´pon, B., Dejemeppe, M., and Gurgand, M. (2005). Counseling the unemployed: does
it lower unemployment duration and recurrence? IZA Discussion paper 1796, Institute
for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany.
Cre´pon, B., Ferracci, M., and Fouge`re, D. (2012). Training the unemployed in France:
how does it affect unemployment duration and recurrence? Annales d’Economie et de
Statistique, (107-108):175–199.
Cre´pon, B., Ferracci, M., Jolivet, G., and Van den Berg, G. J. (2009). Active labor market
policy effects in a dynamic setting. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-
3):595–605.
Crepon, B., Ferracci, M., Jolivet, G., and van den Berg, G. J. (2010). Analyzing the Antic-
ipation of Treatments Using Data on Notification Dates. IZA Discussion Papers 5265,
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
De Giorgi, G. (2005). The New Deal for Young People five years on. Fiscal Studies,
26(3):371–383.
Debauche, E. and Jugnot, S. (2007). Les effets du projet d’action personalise´ sur les sorties
des listes de l’ANPE. Working paper, DARES, Paris, France.
Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., and Kremer, M. (2007). Chapter 61: Using randomization
in development economics research: A toolkit. volume 4 of Handbook of Development
Economics, pages 3895 – 3962. Elsevier.
NONPARAMETRIC IV METHODS FOR DYNAMIC TREATMENT EVALUATION 27
Eberwein, C., Ham, J. C., and LaLonde, R. J. (1997). The impact of being offered and
receiving classroom training on the employment histories of disadvantaged women:
evidence from experimental data. Review of Economic Studies, 64(4):655–682.
Field, E. (2007). Entitled to work: Urban property rights and labor supply in Peru. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4):1561–1602.
Fouge`re, D., Kamionka, T., and Prieto, A. (2010). L’efficacite´ des mesures
d’accompagnement sur le retour a` l’emploi. Review E´conomique, 61(3):599–612.
Freyssinet, J. (2002). La re´form de l’indemnisation du choˆmage en france. IRES Document
de Travail 02.01, IRES.
Gonzalez-Manteiga, W. and Cadarso-Suarez, C. (2007). Asymptotic properties of a gen-
eralized Kaplan-Meier estimator with some applications. Journal of Nonparametric Sta-
tistics, 4:65–78.
Hahn, J., Todd, P., and der Klaauw, W. V. (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment
effects with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica, 69(1):201–209.
Ham, J. C. and LaLonde, R. J. (1996). The effect of sample selection and initial conditions in
duration models: Evidence from experimental data on training. Econometrica, 64(1):175–
205.
Hausman, J. A. and Woutersen, T. (2014). Estimating a semi-parametric duration model
without specifying heterogeneity. Journal of Econometrics, 178:114 – 131. Annals Issue:
Misspecification Test Methods in Econometrics.
Hausman, J. A. and Woutersen, T. M. (2008). The proportional hazard model. In Durlauf,
S. N. and Blume, L. E., editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Heckman, J. J. (2008). Econometric causality. International Statistical Review, 76(1):1–27.
Heckman, J. J., LaLonde, R. J., and Smith, J. A. (1999). The economics and econometrics
of active labor market programs. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors, Handbook of
28 GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG∗, PETYO BONEV†, ENNO MAMMEN‡
Labor Economics, volume 3 of Hanbook of Labor Economics, chapter 31, pages 1865–2097.
Elsevier.
Heckman, J. J. and Navarro, S. (2007). Dynamic discrete choice and dynamic treatment
effects. Journal of Econometrics, 136(2):341–396.
Imbens, G. W. and Angrist, J. D. (1994). Identification and estimation of local average
treatment effects. Econometrica, 62(2):467–475.
Imbens, G. W. and Rubin, D. B. (1997). Estimating outcome distributions for compliers in
instrumental variables models. Review of Economic Studies, 64(4):555–574.
Kalbfleisch, J. D. and Prentice, R. L. (2002). The statistical analysis of failure time data. John
Wiley & Sons, New York.
Karunamuni, R. J. and Alberts, T. (2005). A generalized reflection method of boundary
correction in kernel density estimation. Canadian Journal of Statistics, 33(4):497–509.
Lalive, R. (2008). How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A regression
discontinuity approach. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2):785–806.
Lalive, R., van Ours, J. C., and Zweimller, J. (2005). The effect of benefit sanctions on the
duration of unemployment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(6):1386–1417.
Lancaster, T. (1979). Econometric methods for the duration of unemployment. Economet-
rica, 47(4):939–956.
Lancaster, T. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data. Cambridge University
Press.
Le Barbanchon, T. (2012). The effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits
on unemployment exists and match quality in France. Working paper, Crest.
Meyer, B. D. (1996). What have we learned from the Illinois reemployment bonus exper-
iment? Journal of Labour Economics, 14(1):26–51.
Michael, L., Ruth, M., and Conny, W. (2011). Long-run effects of public sector sponsored
training in west germany. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(4):742–784.
NONPARAMETRIC IV METHODS FOR DYNAMIC TREATMENT EVALUATION 29
Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: identifying impacts on education and health
in the presence of treatment externalities. Econometrica, 72(1):159–217.
Mu¨ller, H. G. and Wang, J. L. (1994). Hazard rate estimation under random censoring
with varying kernels and bandwidths. Biometrics, 50(1):61–76.
Nielsen, J. P. and Linton, O. B. (1995). Kernel estimation in a nonparametric marker
dependent hazard model. The Annals of Statistics, 23(5):1735–1748.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press.
Robins, J. M. and Tsiatis, A. A. (1991). Correcting for non-compliance in randomized
trials using rank preserving structural failure time models. Communications in Statistics
- Theory and Methods, 20:2609–2631.
Sianesi, B. (2004). An evaluation of the Swedish system of Active Labor Market Programs
in the 1990s. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1):133–155.
Tchetgen, E. J., Walter, S., Martinussen, T., and Glymour, M. (2014). Instrumental variable
estimation in a survival context. Biostatistics working paper series 179, Harvard.
Todd, P. E. (2007). Chapter 60: Evaluating social programs with endogenous program
placement and selection of the treated. volume 4 of Handbook of Development Economics,
pages 3847 – 3894. Elsevier.
Tsiatis, G. (1975). A nonidentifiability aspect of the problem of competing risks. Proc. Nat.
Acad. Sci. 72, 72(1):20–22.
Van den Berg, G. J. (2001). Duration models: specification, identification, and multiple
durations. In Heckman, J. and Leamer, E., editors, Handbook of Econometrics, chapter 55,
pages 3381–3460. Elsevier.
Van den Berg, G. J., Bozio, A., and Costa Dias, M. (2014). Policy discontinuity and duration
outcomes. Working Paper.
Vikstro¨m, J. (2014). IPW estimation and related estimators for evaluation of active labor
market policies in a dynamic setting. Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies
30 GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG∗, PETYO BONEV†, ENNO MAMMEN‡
2014:8, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
